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Abstract 
 
Groups make decisions on both the production and the distribution of resources. These 
decisions typically involve a tension between increasing the total level of group resources 
(i.e. social efficiency) and distributing these resources among group members (i.e. 
individuals’ relative shares). This is the case because the redistribution process may destroy 
part of the resources, thus resulting in socially inefficient allocations. Here we apply a dual-
process approach to understand the cognitive underpinnings of this fundamental tension. We 
conducted a set of experiments to examine the extent to which different allocation decisions 
respond to intuition or deliberation. In a newly developed approach, we assess intuition and 
deliberation at both the trait level (using the Cognitive Reflection Test, henceforth CRT) 
and the state level (through the experimental manipulation of response times). To test for 
robustness, experiments were conducted in two countries: the US and India. Despite 
absolute level differences across countries, in both locations we show that: (i) time pressure 
and low CRT scores are associated with individuals’ concerns for their relative shares; (ii) 
time delay and high CRT scores are associated with individuals’ concerns for social 
efficiency. These findings demonstrate that deliberation favours social efficiency by 
overriding individuals’ intuitive tendency to focus on relative shares.  
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Introduction 
 
Groups of individuals, from small-scale societies to large modern organizations, are 
typically involved in both the production and the distribution of resources (1, 2). Because 
the distribution process may result in the destruction of part of the resources, there often 
exists a fundamental conflict between the concern for total group resources (i.e. “social 
efficiency”) and the concern for group members’ relative shares of the group resources.  
 
The conflict between equality and efficiency has indeed traditionally been at the center of the 
debate in distributive justice and social choice theory (1-4). Less attention has been paid, 
however, to “antisocial” concerns such as spitefulness which, like concerns for equality 
(egalitarianism), also relate to individuals’ relative payoffs. Egalitarianism refers to a motivation 
for reducing payoff differences among individuals whereas spitefulness refers to an individual’s 
willingness to maximize the difference between her own payoff and that of others (5-7). Thus, 
both egalitarian and spiteful motives may lead an individual to actively change the group 
members’ relative shares even if the resulting distribution wastes resources and is thus socially 
inefficient. Efficiency, egalitarian and spiteful motives may not only conflict with each other but 
also with self-interest. Yet, people are frequently willing to forego personal gain in order to 
increase group resources, equalize payoffs or maximize their relative share. 
 
When faced with allocation decisions in which conflicts between social motives may arise, 
different individuals often act according to different social preferences (5, 8-15). However, much 
is yet to be learned on the origin of these individual differences in social preferences and on 
whether they can be exogenously manipulated. Our study aims at answering these questions 
following a dual-process approach. 
 
Dual-process theories assume that human decisions result from the interaction between two 
cognitive systems, one that is fast, intuitive, and relatively effortless, and one that is slow, 
deliberative, and relatively effortful (i.e. the so-called systems 1 and 2 (16-19)). The use of a 
dual-process lens raises the following general question: given a decision conflict, which option is 
favoured by the intuitive system? Which one is favoured by the deliberative system? Classifying 
social decisions as intuitive or deliberative is fundamental for our understanding of human 
nature. From a practical viewpoint, this will also allow us to design institutions that encourage 
certain social behaviours and discourage others (20, 21).  
 
Regarding our research question, there is evidence that equality concerns are associated to 
intuitive emotional processing (4, 22, 23) and that deliberation promotes utilitarian choices that 
favour “social efficiency” (e.g. save five lives at the expense of one) in moral dilemmas (24-28). 
In addition, recent trait-level research conducted in laboratory settings in the US and Spain 
shows that individuals with a more intuitive cognitive style are more likely to choose options that 
either equalize payoffs between themselves and others (i.e. egalitarian choices) or maximize their 
own payoff relative to their counterparts (i.e. spiteful choices); by contrast, a more deliberative 
cognitive style is related to choices that increase the counterparts’ payoffs at a very low cost for 
the decision maker thus promoting social efficiency (12, 29). The reported effects have been 
shown to be robust to controlling for cognitive confounding factors such general intelligence 
(12). Relatedly, in contest experiments, more intuitive individuals have been found be more 
willing to “spitefully” overbid in order to outcompete their counterparts (30).  
 
Based upon this evidence, we hypothesized that when faced with social allocation decisions, 
people’s first impulse is to care about the relative share each individual gets (in either an 
egalitarian or spiteful manner) whereas deliberation helps override this tendency and preserve 
social efficiency. Our hypothesis is thus that decisions which rely on intuition are more likely to 
be driven by the consideration of people’s relative payoffs and less likely to be driven by social 
efficiency concerns. By contrast, deliberative choices are more likely to disregard relative 
payoffs in favour of social efficiency. In this paper, we test this hypothesis by adopting a novel 
approach that captures the effect of intuition and deliberation on individuals’ social choices at 
both the trait and the state level. Moreover, to check for robustness, we gathered data from two 
countries: the US and India.  
 
Specifically, we design an online experiment in which participants from the US and India are 
asked to make a series of six simple, cognitively undemanding decisions about real monetary 
allocations between themselves and another anonymous participant (12, 31). Looking at 
individuals’ consistency across decisions, we can classify their choices into three categories of 
social preferences (5): (social) efficiency, egalitarian and spiteful. Social efficiency refers to a 
preference for maximising the sum of both individuals’ payoffs, whereas egalitarianism refers to 
a preference for minimising payoff differences between the two individuals. Finally, spitefulness 
refers to a preference for maximising the decision maker’s relative standing. For each category, 
we use two alternative definitions: one “model-based” definition, based on a generalized version 
of the Fehr & Schmidt (9) model of social preferences; and one “choice-based” definition, based 
on the number of choices which are consistent with a particular preference. These two 
approaches to classify people into behavioural types have been extensively used in economics 
and social psychology, respectively. In addition to these social motives, we also consider self-
interest (i.e. the preference for maximising one’s own absolute payoff with disregard for others) 
as an essential motivation when dealing with material resources. For self-interest, both 
definitions result in the same classification of participants (see Methods for further details). 
 
For the assessment of the role of intuitive vs. deliberative systems in decision making we adopt 
two strategies. On the one hand, we conducted a trait-level analysis by comparing the 
distribution of social motives between subjects who score low on an updated version of the 
extended Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (32, 33) and those who score high. The CRT consists 
of a set of questions that all have an intuitive, yet incorrect, answer that should be first ignored to 
be able to obtain the correct answer. Thus, CRT scores provide a measure of people’s ability to 
suppress automatic/intuitive responses in favour of reflective/deliberative ones. Since answering 
correctly the CRT requires basic numerical ability apart from reflection, we added a Numeracy 
Test in order to account for this possible confound (34, 35). On the other hand, we conducted a 
state-level analysis by manipulating participants’ cognitive mode using time constraints. 
Specifically, previous research has argued that time pressure makes people more likely to rely on 
intuitions (17, 36, 37). By comparing subjects forced to decide in less than 5 seconds (i.e. time 
pressure condition) with those forced to stop and think through their decision for at least 15 
seconds (i.e. time delay condition) we could (a) further support the results of the trait-level 
correlational analysis, and (b) establish a causal link between cognitive reflection and social 
motives (see Methods).   
 
As mentioned, our experiments were conducted using populations from the US and India. 
Previous research suggests that good institutions can foster social norms that spill over to 
citizens’ everyday behaviour (38, 39). Since the US and India score very differently in corruption 
indices (40, 41), one may expect that residents in these two countries have developed different 
preferences. Indeed, behavioural studies show that residents in India are less cooperative (42) 
and more spiteful (43) than residents in the US. Thus, these two locations represent interesting 
robustness checks. 
 
 
Results 
 
CRT and Social Motives 
For the trait-level analysis we assess subjects’ cognitive style, intuitive vs. deliberative, using the 
CRT and study their decisions when there is no time restriction for decision making, i.e. the 
neutral condition (US, n=116; India, n=76). Since in the two “non-neutral” conditions the 
CRT was performed after the treatment manipulations and the effect of CRT is expected to 
be milder when time responses are manipulated, the neutral condition is the proper scenario 
to analyse the effect of CRT on social motives (see next paragraph). In panel A of Figures 1 
to 4, we display the proportion of subjects whose choices can be classified according to the 
aforementioned four categories – social efficiency, egalitarianism, spitefulness and self-
interest, respectively –, broken down into below- and above-median CRT scores. For the 
sake of graphical illustration, the figures are based on above- vs. below-median CRT, 
whereas the statistical analysis uses CRT score (ranging from 0 to 7) as explanatory 
variable. The size of the effect represented graphically thus does not directly compare to the 
size of the effect in the regression analyses, which moreover also control for age and gender 
as potential confounding factors (32, 44).  
 
We find that the relationship between CRT scores and social motives is substantial and 
remarkably similar across countries with the exception of the choice-based egalitarian 
measure. Our regression analysis indeed shows that, for either definition, CRT score is a 
significant (or marginally significant) predictor of all the categories (Probit regressions with 
robust standard errors; see Panel A in Tables S1 to S4 in the Supplementary Information 
(SI)) and the interaction between country and CRT is only marginally significant for the 
choice-based egalitarian variable (p=0.06; all the remaining p’s>0.15; see panel A in Tables 
S5 to S8). Specifically, higher CRT scores predict a significantly lower likelihood of being 
classified as egalitarian and spiteful (all p’s<0.02), but a higher likelihood of belonging to 
the social efficiency (both p’s<0.01) and self-interest categories (p=0.07). Regarding the 
only variable where the effect of CRT marginally differs across countries, i.e. choice-based 
egalitarianism, a joint-significance Wald test on the interaction coefficients reveals that the 
relationship is significant for the US (p<0.01) but not for India (p=0.56). 
 
We conducted our trait-level analysis using only the neutral-condition sample for two 
reasons. First, in the two “non-neutral” conditions the CRT was performed after the 
treatment manipulations. CRT scores can thus be somehow contaminated by spillover 
effects. Second, in line with dual-process theory the effect of CRT should be milder when 
either typically-deliberative, high-CRT individuals are forced to choose quickly or 
typically-intuitive, low-CRT individuals are forced to stop and reflect (that is, in the time 
pressure and time delay conditions, respectively). Nevertheless, we report the main 
regression results considering participants in the time pressure and time delay conditions 
separately (see Tables S9 and S10). We observe that while the sign of the CRT effect does 
not change in any regression with respect to what we observe in Panel A of Tables S1 to S4 
(i.e., in the neutral condition), indeed, the magnitude of the CRT effect is generally reduced, 
especially in the time pressure condition.  
 
From Panel A in Tables S1 to S4, we observe some significant differences between 
countries. In particular, residents in India are less likely to be classified as “socially 
efficient” than residents in the US (p=0.07 and p=0.03 for the model-based and choice-
based definitions, respectively). In the case of egalitarianism, the model-based definition 
yields a marginally significant difference (p=0.06) but the choice-based one does not 
(p=0.93). Moreover, the coefficients of the country variable are of opposite sign in the two 
regressions. Therefore, we treat the difference on egalitarianism with caution. Regarding 
spitefulness, in line with Fehr et al. (43), we find that residents in India are significantly 
more spiteful than residents in the US according to the choice-based definition (p<0.01), 
although not significantly so according to the model-based definition (p=0.33; note that the 
likelihood of finding a significant difference might have been reduced due to the fact that 
the model-based definition only classifies 9% of subjects as spiteful).  
 
Importantly, when including both numeracy skills and CRT scores as predictors, numeracy 
is significant in only one out of seven cases, i.e. choice-based social efficiency (p=0.03; all 
remaining p’s>0.11; see Table S11), indicating that numeracy is unlikely to act as a 
mediator in the relationship between CRT and social motives. In contrast, CRT remains 
significant in all (p’s<0.04) but one regression. The only exception is the model-based 
spitefulness category, in which CRT turns non-significant (p=0.33). Yet, using the choice-
based definition of spitefulness, the significant effect of CRT is robust to controlling for 
numeracy. Thus the effect of CRT on social motives seems to be related to trait 
reflectiveness and not to numeracy skills. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that, across countries, high cognitive reflection is characteristic of 
those individuals motivated by social efficiency and, to a lesser extent, by self-interest, but 
uncharacteristic of individuals whose choices reflect either egalitarian or spiteful motives. 
These results are thus consistent with previous findings showing that individuals with a more 
deliberative cognitive style are more likely to choose options that increase the counterparts’ 
payoffs at a very low cost for the decision maker thus promoting social efficiency whereas a 
more intuitive cognitive style is related to choices that either equalize payoffs between 
themselves and others (i.e. egalitarian choices) or maximize their own payoff relative to their 
counterparts (i.e. spiteful choices) (12, 29). In sum, the trait-level analysis largely supports 
our hypothesis that deliberation favours social efficiency by overriding the individuals’ 
intuitive tendency to care for the relative share each person is allocated with.  
 
Response Times Manipulation and Social Motives 
Panel B in Figures 1 to 4 displays the social motive classification for each experimental 
condition (time pressure and time delay; US: n=97 and n=87; India: n=63 and n=69, 
respectively) for both the US and the India samples. The results of the regression analysis 
are shown in Panel B of Tables S1 to S4. We observe that the direction of the effect of the 
time condition is the same across countries except for the case of self-interest. The effect of 
time delay (vs. time pressure) is significantly positive for both social efficiency variables 
(both p’s<0.01; see Panel B in Table S1). In the case of egalitarianism and spitefulness, the 
effect of time delay is negative and significant for the model-based egalitarian and choice-
based spiteful definitions (both p’s<0.01). This effect is also negative for the choice-based 
egalitarian and model-based spiteful definitions but not significant (both p’s>0.31). The 
time manipulation does not exert a significant effect on self-interest (p=0.83). As shown in 
Tables S5 to S8 (panel B), the interaction between condition and country is never significant 
(all p’s>0.19).  
 
Subjects’ level of experience in similar experiments has been shown to moderate the effect 
of response time manipulations on behaviour in social dilemmas. Experienced subjects are 
typically less responsive to manipulations in games they have been previously exposed to 
(42, 45, 46). To account for this well-documented effect, we decided to provide a robustness 
check for our findings by restricting the analysis to inexperienced subjects (n=100). We find 
that the effect of time delay on self-interest becomes similar across countries (see Panel C in 
Figures 1 to 4). In this inexperienced sample, time delay exerts a marginally significant 
positive effect on self-interest (p=0.06, Panel C in Table S4), whereas the rest of the results 
remain qualitatively unaffected (panel C in Tables S1 to S3) except for choice-based social 
efficiency, which loses its significance (p=0.17). The interaction terms between condition 
and country keep being non-significant (p’s>0.36; see Tables S5 to S8, panel C) except for 
choice-based social efficiency (p=0.06). A Wald test reveals that the effect of time delay on 
choice-based social efficiency is significantly positive for the US sample (p=0.03) but non-
significant for the India sample (p=0.68).  
 
Thus, at the state level of analysis, the results are also consistent with our hypothesis that 
deliberation increases concerns for social efficiency by overriding individuals’ intuitive 
tendency to focus on their relative shares.  
 
Regarding differences between countries, residents in India are more likely than residents in 
the US to be classified as spiteful (p’s<0.01 in both the whole and the inexperienced 
sample) and less likely to favour social efficiency (except for the model-based definition in 
the inexperienced sample, p=0.22, the country variable is significant in all cases, p’s<0.05). 
This is also in line with the results previously described. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Across two different countries and at both the trait and the state levels of analysis, we found 
strong evidence that: (i) intuition promotes individuals’ concern for relative payoffs 
(egalitarian and spiteful choices) and (ii) deliberation promotes individuals’ concern for 
social efficiency. Our results suggest that, as hypothesized, deliberation favours social 
efficiency by overriding the intuitive tendency of individuals to be driven by distributive 
concerns.  
 
Moreover, the qualitative nature of our main findings does not crucially depend on whether 
we use a “model-based” or a “choice-based” classification of subjects. While it is true that 
non-significant effects of deliberation vs. intuition are observed for one of the two 
definitions in some cases, the effects at either the trait or the state level (even when 
considering each country separately) never contradict our hypothesized relationships 
between deliberation and social motives. Additionally, our arguments are also robust to 
analysing each decision separately (see Tables S12 and S13, and the discussion there). One 
social motive which is intimately linked to, and can be confounded with, the notion of social 
efficiency is the Rawlsian maximin preference (1, 8, 14), according to which individuals 
wish to maximize the payoff of the less well-off individual in the group. As shown in the SI, 
however, the effects observed when analysing each decision separately do not support the 
existence of a relationship between deliberation/intuition and maximin preferences.   
 
The evidence presented here suggests that a substantial proportion of individuals care about both 
the total surplus and their relative shares. Yet, these social preferences do not occur 
simultaneously since egalitarian and spiteful concerns seem to be automatic with further 
deliberation leading people to override them in favour of social efficiency. This also means that a 
dual-process approach cannot help us pinpoint the main drivers of the difference between 
egalitarian and spiteful motives. 
 
Our findings are particularly interesting since the relationship between group resources and 
the way they are to be shared has been a continuing source of debate within distributive 
justice and social choice theory (1-4). Our data suggest that people’s reliance on either intuitive 
or deliberative decision making affects the extent to which distributive or efficiency concerns 
dominate. These results are consistent with previous research showing that deliberation favours 
utilitarian judgments in moral dilemmas (24-28), that equality concerns are rooted in intuitive 
emotional processing (4, 22, 23), and that fairness is intuitive (47, 48). Our evidence qualifies 
previous findings by showing that it is not only egalitarianism per se but, more generally, the 
concern for individuals’ relative payoffs that responds to intuition.  
 
In addition, we find some indication that deliberation (high CRT scores and time delay – 
among inexperienced subjects only) may lead to more self-interested decision making. This 
result is in line with previous research suggesting that deliberation makes people pursue 
strategies that maximize their material payoffs (45, 49-52). However, this result does not 
hold in the state-level analysis using the whole sample (both inexperienced and experienced 
subjects), which may have been due to the fact that experience blurs the effect of cognitive 
manipulations (42, 45, 46, 53, 54). Understanding whether deliberation promotes self-
interested choices and the extent to which previous experience moderates these effects are 
important questions for future research.  
 
Note also here that both social efficiency and self-interest relate with absolute payoffs (for 
the group and the self, respectively). Thus, an interpretation of our findings might be that 
people make relative comparisons intuitively but need deliberation to focus on, or process 
information from, absolute values. One may speculate that the information associated to any 
outcome has to be transformed into relative values in order to be processed. This could 
imply that comparison values are processed automatically whereas absolute values are not. 
Given the often suggested link between emotion and intuitive processing (17, 45), one possibility 
is that attribute comparisons are more emotionally charged than absolute attributes and this is 
why they are processed more automatically. Disregarding relative comparisons may therefore 
require inhibiting an emotional response. Future research should explore the validity of these 
arguments in greater detail, within and beyond the social domain.    
 
Related experiments on one-shot social dilemmas suggest that the decision to cooperate is 
intuitive whereas further deliberation leads individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others 
(45, 49-52, 55). However, although cooperation is socially efficient in social dilemmas, the 
decision to cooperate could also stem from egalitarian and reciprocal concerns depending on 
the players’ expectations about others’ behaviour. In addition, free-riding is socially 
inefficient but can result from self-interested, egalitarian, spiteful or reciprocal motives (5, 
8, 12, 13). Thus, if social efficiency concerns (and probably self-interest) require 
deliberation while egalitarian and spiteful motives, as well as reciprocity (54), respond to 
intuition, the net effect of promoting intuition vs. deliberation on social dilemma behaviour 
is not straightforward. This could partially explain why a number of studies have failed to 
find consistent effects or have even yielded conflicting results (46, 56-60).  
 
Regarding differences between countries, we have shown that Indians are in general more 
likely than Americans to be classified as spiteful and less likely to be classified as socially 
efficient. These results are consistent with previous research suggesting that India residents 
are more spiteful (43), less cooperative (42), and less altruistic (61) than US residents. In 
addition, this observation adds support to the robustness of our main findings since the 
observed effects (both at the trait and state level) are remarkably similar across countries, 
regardless of being two societies with seemingly different social preferences at the 
aggregate level. 
 
Moreover, the differences observed between our experimental treatments indicate that 
individuals’ social motives can be, at least partially, exogenously manipulated. This may 
have important implications for the design of mechanisms and institutions aimed at 
promoting certain social or behavioural outcomes. Future state-level investigations should 
also go beyond time constraints. The use of time constraints, instead of other cognitive 
manipulations (such as cognitive load, ego-depletion, or conceptual priming), was motivated by 
the observation that many social and economic interactions require people to make decisions as 
quickly as possible. Traders and last-minute bidders, for example, have to make decisions within 
seconds after new information is acquired (62-64). Also, social interactions often require quick 
decision making, for example, because deliberating may be met with distrust by observers (65-
68). However, many social and economic interactions also occur when people are hungry or 
thirsty, or when they have experienced fatigue, suggesting that cognitive load or ego 
depletion are particularly relevant manipulations. Since these factors have been shown to 
impair deliberative processing and affect behaviour in a number of situations (69-72), it 
would be fruitful to extend our analysis to these other cognitive manipulations. 
 
Finally, in this study and for the sake of focusing on the conflict between total and relative 
payoffs, we have analysed social efficiency, egalitarian and spiteful motives. Indeed, previous 
research emphasizes the relevance of this categorization (5, 8, 10). However, other social 
motives have been considered in the literature, such as hyper-altruism (i.e. weighting the other’s 
payoff more than one’s own (73-75)) and extreme altruism (risking one’s own life to save 
someone else’s (76)). Further research may use a different set of decision problems to classify 
these other motives. 
 
  
Methods 
 
Design and procedure 
We conducted the experiments with participants from the US and India using monetary 
incentives. The stakes for the experiment conducted with Indian participants were one third 
of the stakes in the experiment with US participants (expressed in Indian Rupees and US 
dollars, respectively). This was done to equate the purchasing power of participants’ 
payments in both countries according to the latest data from the World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPPC.RF). Since the two studies differed only 
with regards to the monetary incentives, we report here only the details about the 
experimental procedure used with the US subjects.  
     
Subjects were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (77-81) and earned $0.90 for 
participating in a 15-minute (mean=23, median=16) study. In addition, they received an 
extra payment depending on their performance during the experiment. Participation fees and 
extra payments were chosen in order to guarantee that participants, on average, would earn a 
total bonus above the minimum wage of the country where they were based at the time of 
the experiment. Although stakes were well below the average stake used in standard 
laboratory experiments, they were within the range of AMT experiments. A number of 
studies have shown that data collected using AMT are both qualitatively and quantitatively 
comparable with those collected using the standard physical laboratory (77-81). Moreover, 
several studies have investigated the effect of stakes on pro-sociality and found that pro-
social choices decrease when passing from no-stakes to small-stakes (82), but then they are 
stake-independent (as long as stakes are not too high) in a number of economic games 
including the Dictator Game (83), the Public Goods game (84), the Trust Game (85), and the 
Ultimatum Game (86). A recent study even shows that well-established patterns of social 
behaviour which are observed in complex interactive experiments in the laboratory are 
replicated in AMT (87). In sum, previous research supports the claim that data gathered using 
AMT with relatively small stakes are of no less quality than those collected in the standard 
physical laboratory.  
 
After entering their MTurk ID, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: neutral, time pressure or time delay. In each condition, participants were asked 
to make six binary decisions about how to allocate a number of points (10 points = $0.90) 
between themselves and another anonymous participant they were matched with. These 
decision problems were used to infer individuals’ social motives, as in Study 2 of Corgnet et 
al. (12). In the time pressure condition, participants were asked to make each choice within 
5 seconds. In the time delay condition, they were asked to wait for at least 15 seconds before 
making each choice. The time limits (<5s vs. >15s) were chosen following previous 
research (58). Subjects’ average response time was 2.14 and 22.57 seconds in the time 
pressure and time delay conditions, respectively (this difference is significant, p<0.01, t-
test). Only subjects who respected the time constraints are considered for the analyses. If we 
include those subjects who did not respect them (56), the results are qualitatively similar 
(see Tables S14 to S17). In the neutral condition, participants were left free to make their 
choices at any time (average response time = 5.40 seconds, which differs significantly from 
the other two conditions, both p’s<0.01, t-test). See the next subsection for the exact 
decision problems. 
 
After the decisions were made, we asked four comprehension questions. Subjects failing any 
comprehension question were automatically excluded from the experiment and received no 
payment.  
 
Subjects who passed the comprehension questions then completed a Numeracy Test (88, 89) 
and an extended 7-item Cognitive Reflection Test (32, 33). We included the Numeracy Test 
to assess whether any relation between CRT scores and choices could be due to 
computational skills rather than to one’s capacity to reflect/deliberate (33-35). Controlling 
for numeracy in our analysis is essential because solving CRT questions not only requires 
blocking incorrect intuitive answers but it also entails basic computation skills to find the 
correct answer to the problem. Indeed, scores in both tests are highly correlated (Spearman 
ρ=0.60, p<0.01, n=192). We modified the original CRT questions in (32) and (33) so that 
Mturkers could not access the answers online while completing the study, which may be a 
serious issue (90). We thus changed the context and the numerical solutions of the original 
CRT questions without changing the spirit of the test. The CRT was included at the end of 
the experiment to avoid priming reflective processing (27) thus distorting the relationship 
between social behaviour and reflection. Correct answers were incentivized with a $0.06 
reward. As is standard, no time restriction was imposed in any of the tests. Both tests can be 
found in the Supplementary Information (SI). 
 
Finally, subjects filled a questionnaire with the usual socio-demographic questions. To 
analyse the role of experience (42, 45, 46, 49, 53, 54), we asked subjects “To what extent 
have you previously participated in other studies like this one (i.e., exchanging money with 
a stranger)?”. Responses were collected using a 5-point likert-scale from 1 = “Never” to 5 = 
“Several times”. See the SI for full experimental instructions. 
 
Social motives elicitation 
In each decision problem, participants were asked to choose between the egalitarian Option 
A and the non-egalitarian Option B: Option A always allocates 10 points to the decision 
maker (DM) and 10 points to the other participant, whereas the distribution of points 
associated with Option B depends on the decision problem (see Table 1). 
 
Participants were informed that their final payoff would be determined by only one decision 
selected at random. In this way, we encouraged participants to treat each decision 
independently. 
 
This task is particularly suited to analyse the cognitive underpinnings of social behaviour 
because it is short and cognitively undemanding (12). In addition, it allows us to assess 
possible asymmetries in social preferences related to either advantageous or 
disadvantageous payoff comparisons (9). Thus, the task provides a good balance between 
the amount of information gathered and the complexity of the decisions. We classify 
individuals’ choices as follows:  
 
i.   Socially efficient, if they maximize the total joint payoff; 
ii.   Egalitarian, if they minimize payoff inequality; 
iii.   Spiteful, if they maximize the decision maker’s relative standing by minimizing the 
other’s payoff;  
iv.   Self-interested, if they maximize the decision maker’s own payoff.  
 
Importantly, we do not force a trade-off between any two types of motives across decisions but it 
is instead an individual’s complete set of choices that allows us to infer her motives. In some 
decisions in our task, for instance, there is a conflict between egalitarian and socially efficient 
options, whereas in others equality and social efficiency are aligned but in conflict with self-
interest and/or spitefulness. Table 1 shows the motives that are consistent with each option in 
each decision. It can be seen that from one single decision it would be hard to say with certainty 
which social motive is driving choice. This happens in nearly all economic games on social 
preferences (8, 12). Therefore, we need to analyse the consistency of motives across decisions. 
 
Table 1. Association between choices and social preferences.  
Decision # Option A payoffs (DM, other) 
Option B payoffs 
(DM, other) 
Motives consistent with 
Option A 
Motives consistent with 
Option B 
Decision 1 (10, 10) (10, 6) 
Efficiency 
Egalitarian 
Self-interest 
Spiteful 
Self-interest 
Decision 2 (10, 10) (16, 4) Efficiency Egalitarian 
Efficiency 
Spiteful 
Self-interest 
Decision 3 (10, 10) (10, 18) 
Egalitarian 
Spiteful 
Self-interest 
Efficiency 
Self-interest 
Decision 4 (10, 10) (11, 19) Egalitarian Spiteful 
Efficiency 
Self-interest 
Decision 5 (10, 10) (12, 4) Efficiency Egalitarian 
Spiteful 
Self-interest 
Decision 6 (10, 10) (8, 16) 
Egalitarian 
Self-interest 
Spiteful 
Efficiency 
Notes: One motive is associated to both options when an individual motivated by such a preference would be 
indifferent between Options A and B in that decision. 
 
Statistical analysis 
For each of the three social motives we consider two alternative definitions. First, we 
classify subjects using a generalized Fehr-Schmidt (9) model which is extensively used in 
social preferences research and has been used in previous studies (12, 29). The “model-
based” definition captures those subjects whose choices are perfectly consistent with the 
parameters of a generalized Fehr-Schmidt (9) model characterizing a particular motive (12) 
(see SI). Alternative approaches such as the Charness-Rabin (8) model would result in an 
identical classification of subjects, since the parameters of the basic Charness-Rabin model 
are linear transformations of the Fehr-Schmidt parameters (8, 91). Second, following the 
tradition of research on social value orientation (10), we also consider a “choice-based” 
definition in which at least 2/3 of the choices (i.e. 4 or more) are consistent with that 
specific motive. We obtain similar results if we use a “3 or more” or a “5 or more” criterion 
instead.  Model-based definitions to classify people follow the standards in economics 
whereas social psychology research has traditionally relied on choice-based definitions. 
Since both types of definitions have their own (dis)advantages and we do not find any 
reason to favour one of these two research traditions over the other, we show the results for 
both definitions. In fact, this strengthens our findings. The Spearman correlations between 
the two definitions are 0.41, 0.60 and 0.44 (all p’s<0.01, n=508) for efficiency, egalitarian 
and spiteful motives, respectively. The classification of subjects according to the model-
based definitions leads to mutually exclusive categories; however, this is not the case for the 
choice-based definitions. Note that both definitions are equivalent for self-interest. 
 
In our analyses, we exclude those subjects (13%) whose choices were inconsistent (i.e. the 
subject chose to increase/reduce the counterpart’s payoff in one decision but s/he did not 
take the same action in another decision where doing so was less costly), which also means 
that we can obtain a reliable range for the parameters used in the model-based definition for 
all subjects included. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of subjects classified as Socially Efficient, broken down into below- 
and above-median CRT scores (panel A; below/above-median CRT: n=65/51 in US, 
n=32/44 in India), time pressure and time delay for all subjects (panel B; time 
pressure/delay: n= 97/87 in US, n= 63/69 in India) and for inexperienced subjects only 
(panel C; time pressure/delay: n= 26/19 in US, n= 27/28 in India).  
 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of subjects classified as Egalitarian, broken down into below- and 
above-median CRT scores (panel A), time pressure and time delay for all subjects (panel B) 
and for inexperienced subjects only (panel C). See caption of Figure 1 for the number of 
observations in each subgroup. 
  
 
Figure 3. Proportion of subjects classified as Spiteful, broken down into below- and above-
median CRT scores (panel A), time pressure and time delay for all subjects (panel B) and 
for inexperienced subjects only (panel C). See caption of Figure 1 for the number of 
observations in each subgroup. 
 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of subjects classified as Self-Interested, broken down into below- and 
above-median CRT scores (panel A), time pressure and time delay for all subjects (panel B) 
and for inexperienced subjects only (panel C). See caption of Figure 1 for the number of 
observations in each subgroup. 
